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4Prospects for Growth in Africa: 
Learning from Patterns of Long-Term 
Economic Change
Less than two years ago in the African Economic Outlook 2008 the OECD reported that “for four consecutive years Africa has experienced record growth”. The report further 
projected economic growth to rise up to 6 percent in 2009. The 
IMF recently reported that growth had turned to stagnation 
expected average per capita income across sub-Saharan Africa 
to fall in 2010. Whether the current slowdown will prove to be a short term fluctuation, or 
the beginning of another period of prolonged economic stagnation, it is still too early to tell. 
The recent turn of fortunes was unexpected and did not originate in the African domestic 
political economy, but was rather a result of world economic conditions. Last time, in the 
1980s,   when growth failed across most African economies, a vivid debate ensued.  At stake 
was whether the growth failure was due to internal or external causes. In practical terms this 
debate ended with the implementation of structural adjustment programmes across the African 
continent from the 1980s onwards. Growth recovery was slow, and both in academic and 
popular perception the growth outlook for African economies turned increasingly pessimistic.
Thus the African post-colonial experience has been the chronic failure of economic growth. 
The problem for analysis is to determine its causes. The initial research on African economic 
growth performance focused on averaged gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth 
in the post-colonial period. By making almost exclusive use of statistics that show average 
growth over time, the literature did not seek to explain periods of growth and stagnation, but 
focused on explaining slow growth overall. By extension, since most poor economies have 
displayed slow growth on average, explaining slow growth was conflated with explaining 
low income. This stylised fact of permanent stagnation, which rings well with the popular 
view of the current income distribution of income and growth in the world, embodied in the 
phrase ‘the bottom billion’, has provided the impetus for an economic growth literature that 
investigates the historical causes of persistence of low income in African economies. Thus it has 
been argued that the fundamental cause of Africa’s current relative poverty is the lack of pro-
growth institutions, which originated either under the colonial system or during the period of 
slavery, or even as a result of African special geographical features or population characteristics.
It is argued here that in the long run the growth experience of African economies is better 
approached as ‘growth recurring’. There have been sustained periods of per capita income 
increases in Africa in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. Although most 
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5of these periods were not ‘growth triumphant’ as in the case of 
European industrialisation or in late developers in other regions 
such as East-Asia, they were still important in that they were 
associated with qualitative changes of how society was organised 
and led to significant increases in some kind of economic welfare. 
A few examples of growth experiences will briefly be reviewed here, 
before we return to reconsider the prospects for African growth.
FrOM SLAvE TrADE TO LEGITIMATE COMMErCE
African economies are often viewed as marginalised in the world 
economy, yet most of them, have been, if not fully integrated in the 
strict economic sense, then extensively and intensively involved in 
the world economy for centuries. Polities based on and specialised in 
long distance trade have been particularly prominent in West Africa 
and the transatlantic trade. World trade is also a key theme in the 
history of East Africa and Central Africa where both the Indian Ocean 
and trans-Saharan trade were central to the African economies. 
The Atlantic slave trade is a particularly well documented episode 
in African pre-colonial economic history.  In Slavery, Colonialism 
and Economic Growth, Patrick Manning attempted to use external 
trade data to express the trade effects in GDP per capita terms for 
Dahomey, finding that during the height of the slave trade the per 
capita export revenue in Dahomey was comparable to that of 
Great Britain. The profitable slave business facilitated the growth 
of stronger states. Imports of money and other commodities 
further spurred exchange and growth in the domestic economy. 
When the slave trade ended in the 19th century, this undermined 
the fiscal basis of Dahomey as well as other West African states.
The closing of the Atlantic slave trade market meant stagnation and loss 
of power for centralised states as fiscal capacity disappeared.  Though 
it did not always mean the end of slavery as a mode of production, 
the end of the slave trade opened up new economic opportunities. 
It paved the way for what has been called the period of ‘legitimate’ 
commerce and the ‘cash-crop revolution’ in Sub-Saharan Africa.
6The cocoa boom is particularly prominent, originating in the colony 
of the Gold Coast, and spreading to other areas such as the Ivory 
Coast and Nigeria. Here peasants responded favourably to the earning 
potential from an external market demand for this new cash crop. In 
his recent study Labour, Land and Capital, Gareth Austin writes that in 
Ghana ‘much of the rise in rural output should be attributed to higher 
productivity’ and considers that ‘there is no doubt that the expansion 
of production also involved a vast increase in the quantities of resources 
employed within the rural economy’. In particular cocoa production 
needs investment ‘in the stock of capital in the form of cocoa trees’. 
Szereszewski’s income estimates for the period between 1891 and 
1911 indicate a period of rapid growth. If ‘traditional consumption’ 
is not taken into account, GDP per capita more than tripled over two 
decades, implying a 6.5 percent per capita growth over the period.
rECUrrING GrOWTH AND PArADIGMS
The modest task of social scientists is to come up with good research 
questions. This short piece argues that there is a crucial difference 
between approaching the conundrum of African growth by asking 
why there has been a chronic growth failure and that of asking why 
African economies grew and why they retrogressed. There have 
been periods of rapid economic change and accumulation, which 
in turn caused important qualitative changes in how societies and 
economies were organised. It seems to me that the study of growth 
as a recurring process is central to understanding the prospects for 
sustained growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. While we do know how these 
periods of growth are related to world economic patterns, research 
on how these patterns change economic power and structure in 
African economies are key, yet relatively understudied questions that 
demand answers. The growth episodes here were rooted in trade 
and the world economy, but the growth was only possible due to a 
reorganisation of factors of production, a combination of investment 
and technological growth that had political economy consequences.
Boom and bust cycles in African economic history have left lasting 
effects.  Growth in the pre-colonial period, when based in slave 
trade, was absolutely unsustainable in the long term. Yet the 
rent from this growth was captured by elites, and in some cases 
7facilitated the temporary underpinning of states and their fiscal 
capacity.  The end of the slave trade was forced externally, although 
some areas and states did attempt to disengage earlier than the 
19th Century. The growth of export crop production in the 19th 
Century did entail large improvements in GDP per capita, which 
were enjoyed by the peasant population, sometimes directly. 
Through marketing boards, instituted during colonial rule, the receipts 
from these exports were increasingly captured by the state.  In the 
post-colonial period these earnings was channelled into very high 
rates of capital formation and state investment-led growth. The global 
economic downturn in the 1970s hit Africa particularly hard. Between 
1975 and 1995, a combination of depressed demand in external 
markets and elites turning to predatory rent-seeking ensured that 
growth did fail in the majority of African economies.  It is also widely 
recognised that this economic downturn also led to a political disorder, 
state failure and the increased incidence of civil war. After a prolonged 
period of structural adjustment, growth did return, particularly due to 
renewed demand and increased prices for primary product exports. 
vantage point is everything. The growth failure in the 1970s caused 
a paradigmatic shift in development circles as development optimism 
turned to development pessimism. Now the current slowdown puts 
even very recent publications such as Edward Miguel‘s Africa’s Turn? 
and the 2008 World Bank volume Africa at a Turning Point? in a less 
favourable light. There are even signs Keynesianism is coming back in 
fashion: in strict contrast to the austerity prescribed in the 1980,  in 
the recent regional Economic Outlook the IMF suggested the use of 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy to weather the storm. However, because 
of structural adjustment the ability of African states to intervene in 
their own markets is now very limited, and therefore the capacity to 
soften the downturn with counter-cyclical fiscal policy will depend 
on their ability to raise funds in world markets. The eventual return 
of growth in Africa will ultimately depend on the world economy. 
 
